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Abstract
In this paper, using the fixed point theorem for Kakutani factorizable multifunctions, we shall
prove new existence theorems of best proximity pairs and equilibrium pairs for free abstract
economies, which include the previous fixed point theorems and equilibrium existence theorems.
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1. Introduction
The best approximation theorem due to Fan [6] states that if K is a non-empty compact
convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space E with a continuous
seminorm p, and f :K → E is a single-valued continuous function, then there exists an
element x¯ ∈ K such that
p
(
f (x¯) − x¯)= dp(f (x¯),K) := inf{p(f (x¯) − y) ∣∣ y ∈ K}.
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directions by several authors (e.g., see [12–17,19]). Indeed, Reich [12] has shown that
even if K is a non-empty approximately p-compact convex subset of a locally convex
Hausdorff topological vector space E with a relatively compact image f (K), then the
same conclusion holds. Later, Sehgal and Singh [15] have extended this result to convex
valued continuous multifunctions. More recently, Srinivasan and Veeramani [16,17] have
extended those results into the general forms of existence theorems for best proximity
pairs, and as applications, they have proved new existence theorems of equilibrium pairs
for constrained generalized games, which generalize the previous equilibrium concepts for
generalized games in [1–4,7,8,10,11,18,20].
In this paper, using Lassonde’s fixed point theorem for Kakutani factorizable multi-
functions, we shall prove generalizations of the theorems for best proximity pairs due to
Srinivasan and Veeramani [16,17], and as applications, we shall prove new existence theo-
rems of equilibrium pairs for free n-person games.
2. Preliminaries
Let A be a subset of a topological space X. We shall denote by 2A the family of all
subsets of A, and by intA the interior of A in X, and by clA the closure of A in X. If
A is a subset of a vector space, we shall denote by coA the convex hull of A. If A is a
non-empty subset of a topological vector space X and S, T :A → 2X are multifunctions
(also said correspondences or set-valued functions), then coT , clT , T ∩ S :A → 2X are
multifunctions defined by (coT )(x) = coT (x), (clT )(x) = clT (x), and (T ∩ S)(x) =
T (x) ∩ S(x) for each x ∈ A, respectively.
We recall the following continuity definitions for multifunctions in [1,5,8]. Let X,Y
be non-empty topological spaces and T :X → 2Y be a multifunction. A multifunction
T :X → 2Y is said to be upper semicontinuous (in X) if for each x ∈ X and each open
set V in Y with T (x) ⊂ V , there exists an open neighborhood U of x in X such that
T (y) ⊂ V for each y ∈ U ; and a multifunction T :X → 2Y is said to be lower semicontin-
uous (in X) if for each x ∈ X and each open set V in Y with T (x)∩V = ∅, there exists an
open neighborhood U of x in X such that T (y) ∩ V = ∅ for each y ∈ U . It is also known
that T :X → 2Y is lower semicontinuous in X if and only if for each closed set V in Y , the
set {x ∈ X | T (x) ⊂ V } is closed in X.
Here we note that by the definition, T is automatically lower semicontinuous at every x
where T (x) = ∅, and also note that if T has open lower sections (i.e., T −1(y) is open for
each y ∈ Y ), then T is lower semicontinuous, e.g., see Yannelis and Prabhakar [20].
Let X and Y be any two subsets of a normed space E with a norm ‖ · ‖, and the metric
d(x, y) is induced by the norm. Then, we now recall the following notations:
d(X,Y ) := inf{d(x, y) | x ∈ X,y ∈ Y};
Prox(X,Y ) := {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | d(x, y) = d(X,Y )};
Xo :=
{
x ∈ X | d(x, y) = d(X,Y ) for some y ∈ Y};
Yo :=
{
y ∈ Y | d(x, y) = d(X,Y ) for some x ∈ X}.
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d(x, y) denotes d(X,Y ) which is precisely ‖x − y‖. If X and Y are non-empty compact
and convex subsets of a normed linear space, then it is easy to see that Xo and Yo are both
non-empty compact and convex.
Let X and Y be two non-empty subsets of a normed linear space E, and let T :X → 2Y
be a multifunction. Then the pair (x¯, T (x¯)) is called the best proximity pair [16] for T if
d(x¯, T (x¯)) = d(x¯, y¯) = d(X,Y ) for some y¯ ∈ T (x¯). Then the best proximity pair theorem
seeks an appropriate solution which is optimal. In fact, the best proximity pair theorem
analyzes the conditions which the problem of minimizing the real-valued function x 	→
d(x,T (x)) has a solution.
Let I be a finite (or an infinite) index set. For each i ∈ I , let X and Yi be non-empty
subsets of a normed space E with a norm ‖ · ‖, and the metric d(x, y) is induced by the
norm. Then we can use the following notations: for each i ∈ I ,
d(X,Yi) := inf
{
d(x, y) | x ∈ X,y ∈ Yi
};
Xo := {x ∈ X | for each i ∈ I, ∃yi ∈ Yi such that d(x, yi) = d(X,Yi)};
Yoi :=
{
y ∈ Yi | there exists x ∈ X such that d(x, y) = d(X,Yi)
}
.
When |I | = 1, it is easy to see that Xo = Xo and Yo = Yoi .
Let X be a non-empty subset of a normed linear space E, and consider the metric
projection map PX : E → 2X defined by for each z ∈ E,
PX(z) :=
{
x ∈ X | ‖z − x‖ = d(z,X)}.
Then, it is well known that if X is compact and convex, then PX(x) is a non-empty compact
and convex subset of X, and the multifunction PX is upper semicontinuous on X. For the
properties of the metric projection, see [12–14].
A multifunction T :X → 2Y from a topological space X to another topological space
Y is said to be a Kakutani multifunction [9] if the following conditions are satisfied: (i) T
is upper semicontinuous; (ii) either T (x) is a singleton for each x ∈ X (in which case Y
is required to be a Hausdorff topological vector space) or for each x ∈ X, T (x) is a non-
empty compact and convex subset of Y (in which case Y is required to be a convex subset
of a Hausdorff topological vector space).
The collection of all Kakutani multifunctions from X to Y is denoted by K(X,Y ).
A multifunction T :X → 2Y from a topological space X to another topological space Y is
said to be a Kakutani factorizable multifunction [9] if it can be expressed as a composi-
tion of finitely many Kakutani multifunctions. The collection of all Kakutani factorizable
multifunctions from X to Y is denoted by KC(X,Y ).
If T = T1 ◦T2 ◦ · · · ◦Tn is a Kakutani factorizable multifunction, then the multifunctions
T1, T2, . . . , Tn are known as the factors of T . It should be noted that the Kakutani factor-
izable multifunction need not be convex valued even though each of its factors is convex
valued.
In a recent paper [16], Srinivasan and Veeramani introduced a slight generalization of
Kakutani factorizable multifunctions as follows.
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logical space Y is said to be a generalized Kakutani factorizable multifunction if there
exists a diagram T : X = X1 T1−→ X2 T2−→ · · ·Xn Tn−→ Xn+1 = Y such that the following
conditions are satisfied: for each i = 2,3, . . . , n,
(1) Ti is upper semicontinuous, and T1 ∈K(X1,X2);
(2) for each x ∈ Ti−1(Xi−1), Ti(x) is a non-empty subset of Xi+1;
(3) either Ti is single-valued (in which case Xi+1 is required to be a Hausdorff topological
vector space) or for each x ∈ Xi , Ti(x) is a compact and convex subset of Xi+1 (in
which case Xi+1 is required to be a convex subset of a Hausdorff topological vector
space).
The collection of all generalized Kakutani factorizable multifunctions from X to Y is
denoted by K′C(X,Y ). Then it is clear that K(X,Y ) ⊆KC(X,Y ) ⊆K′C(X,Y ).
The following form of Lassonde’s fixed point theorem, which is due to Srinivasan and
Veeramani, is very essential in proving our main results:
Lemma 1 [16]. If X is a non-empty compact and convex subset of a locally convex Haus-
dorff topological vector space, then any generalized Kakutani factorizable multifunction
T :X → 2X has a fixed point, i.e., if T ∈ K′C(X,X), then there exists a point x¯ ∈ X such
that x¯ ∈ T (x¯).
Also we shall need an existence theorem for maximal elements in order to prove the
existence of equilibrium pairs for free generalized games. The following existence theorem
for maximal elements is given in finite dimensional spaces in [1, p. 33], but it is easy to see
that its proof works in infinite dimensional spaces as follows:
Lemma 2 [1]. Let X be a non-empty compact convex subset of a normed linear space, and
let T :X → 2X be a multifunction satisfying that
(1) x /∈ coT (x) for each x ∈ X;
(2) if y ∈ T −1(x), then there exists some x′ ∈ X (possibly x′ = x) such that y ∈
intT −1(x′).
Then there exists a maximal element x¯ ∈ X for T , i.e., T (x¯) = ∅.
Now we consider the following economic situation which is motivated to introduce
the equilibrium pair concept. Suppose that goods are manufactured and sold in different
locations. Each location (or agent) can be a manufacturing as well as selling unit. It is
agreed that the ultimate place where the goods get sold would be determining the payoff
for the goods. Let there be n such locations. For each location, two strategies Xi and Yi
are associated, one to that of manufacturing unit and other to that of selling unit. Knowing
the manufacturing strategy xi ∈ Xi := ∏j∈I\{i} Xj of all other locations, the choice of
selling strategy, which is strongly dependent to the cost, at the ith location is restricted to
Ai(x) ⊆ Yi . Also, let the preference Pi(y) at the ith location be given such that Pi(y) is
the set of preferred strategies to the given strategy y ∈ Y =∏ Yi which can maximizei∈I
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dependent to the consumer’s behavior at the ith location. Hence, we can investigate the
system of multifunctions Ai : X =∏j∈I Xj → 2Yi and Pi : Y =∏j∈I Yj → 2Yi for each
i ∈ I . Moreover, the cost involved in the travel of goods to different places should also
be taken into account. In this situation, one cannot expect an equilibrium for the abstract
economy (or generalized game) of the Shafer–Sonnenschein or Yannelis–Prabhakar model
in [4,18,20] because the strategy sets Xi and Yi may be different.
Hence we shall introduce a new general concept of equilibrium pair as follows: Let I
be a finite or an infinite set of locations or agents. For each i ∈ I, let Xi be a non-empty
set of manufacturing commodities, and Yi be a non-empty set of selling commodities.
A free abstract economy (or free generalized game) Γ = (Xi, Yi,Ai,Pi)i∈I is defined as a
family of ordered quadruples (Xi, Yi,Ai,Pi) where Xi and Yi are non-empty subsets of a
normed linear space E, and Ai : X =∏j∈I Xj → 2Yi is a constraint correspondence, and
Pi : Y =∏j∈I Yj → 2Yi is a preference correspondence. An equilibrium pair for Γ is a
pair of points (x¯, y¯) = ((x¯i)i∈I , (y¯i)i∈I ) ∈ X × Y such that for each i ∈ I, y¯i ∈ Ai(x¯) with
d(x¯i , y¯i ) = d(Xi,Yi), and Ai(x¯) ∩ Pi(y¯) = ∅.
Whenever Xi = X for each i ∈ I , for the simplicity, we may assume Ai :X → 2Yi
instead of Ai :
∏
j∈I Xj → 2Yi for the free abstract economy Γ = (X,Yi,Ai,Pi)i∈I and
equilibrium pair. In particular, when I = {1, . . . , n}, we may call Γ a free n-person game.
In view of these points, it is natural to search a pair of points (x, y) ∈ X × Y , which is
fulfilled the requirement as in the case of equilibrium pair of a free abstract economy, i.e.,
for each i ∈ I , minimize the travelling cost d(xi, yi), and also, maximize the preference
Pi(y) on the constraint set Ai(x). Therefore, it is contemplated to find a pair of points
(x¯, y¯) ∈ X×Y such that for each i ∈ I , y¯i ∈ Ai(x¯) and Ai(x¯)∩Pi(y¯) = ∅, and ‖x¯i − y¯i‖ =
d(Xi,Yi), where d(Xi,Yi) = inf{‖xi − yi‖ | xi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ Yi}.
When Xi = Yi for each i ∈ I , then the previous definitions can be reduced to the
standard definitions of equilibrium theory in economics due to Debreu [2], Shafer and
Sonnenschein [18] or Yannelis and Prabhakar [20]. For more economic meanings and in-
terpretations, see [1–4,8,10,11].
3. Existence of best proximity pairs
We begin with the following existence theorem for the best proximity pairs:
Theorem 1. For each i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, let X and Yi be non-empty compact and convex
subsets of a normed linear space E, and let Ti :X → 2Yi be an upper semicontinuous
multifunction in Xo such that Ti(x) is a non-empty closed and convex subset of Yi for each
x ∈ X. Assume that Ti(x) ∩ Yoi = ∅ for each x ∈ Xo.
Then there exists a system of best proximity pairs {x¯i} × Ti(x¯i) ⊆ X × Yi , i.e., for each
i ∈ I , d(x¯i , Ti(x¯i )) = d(X,Yi).
Proof. Since X and Yi are non-empty compact and convex, it is easy to prove that Xo
and Yoi are non-empty compact and convex. In fact, let x1, x2 ∈ Xo be arbitrary. Then, for
each i ∈ I , there exist y1, y2 ∈ Yi such that d(xi, yj ) = d(X,Yi) for each j = 1,2. For anyi i i
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yˆi ∈ Yi . Then we have
d(xˆ, yˆi ) =
∥∥(λx1 + (1 − λ)x2)− (λy1i + (1 − λ)y2i )∥∥
= ∥∥λ(x1 − y1i )+ (1 − λ)(x2 − y2i )∥∥
 λ
∥∥x1 − y1i ∥∥+ (1 − λ)∥∥x2 − y2i ∥∥= d(X,Yi),
and so xˆ ∈ Xo, and hence Xo is convex. Similarly, the convexity for Yoi can be proved.
In order to show that Xo is a closed subset of X, let (xn)n∈N be a sequence in Xo
which converges to x˜ ∈ X. Let i ∈ I be fixed and let ki := d(X,Yi) = inf{‖x −yi‖ | x ∈ X,
yi ∈ Yi}. Then, for each n ∈ N, there exists yin ∈ Yi such that ‖xn − yin‖ = ki . Since Yi is
compact, there exists a convergent subsequence (yink ) of (y
i
n) which converges to y˜i ∈ Yi .
Then we can see that
ki  ‖x˜ − y˜i‖ =
∥∥x˜ − xnk + xnk − yink + yink − y˜i
∥∥
 ‖x˜ − xnk‖ +
∥∥xnk − yink
∥∥+ ∥∥yink − y˜i
∥∥.
Since ‖x˜ − xnk‖ → 0 and ‖yink − y˜i‖ → 0, and ‖xnk − yink‖ = ki , we have ‖x˜ − y˜i‖ = ki so
that x˜ ∈ Xo. Therefore, Xo is closed. Similarly, the closedness of Yoi can be shown. Also,
it is known that the metric projection map PX :E → 2X is upper semicontinuous in E such
that PX(z) is a non-empty compact convex subset of X for each z ∈ E. For each i ∈ I , we
now define a multifunction T ′i :Xo → 2Y
o
i by
T ′i (x) := Ti(x) ∩ Yoi for each x ∈ Xo.
Then, by the assumptions, each T ′i (x) is non-empty and compact convex in Y
o
i . Also, T
′
i
is upper semicontinuous in Xo. Next, we claim that if y ∈ Yoi , then PX(y) is a non-empty
subset of Xo. In fact, if y ∈ Yoi , then there exists xi ∈ X such that d(xi, y) = d(X,Yi).
Let x ∈ PX(y) be arbitrary. Then we have d(y, x) = d(y,X) d(y, xi) = d(X,Yi) so that
d(y, x) = d(X,Yi) for each i ∈ I , and hence x ∈ Xo. Therefore, PX(Y oi )Xo.
Now we introduce the following multifunctions T ′ :
∏
i∈I Xo → 2
∏
i∈I Y oi , defined by
T ′(x1, . . . , xn) :=
∏
i∈I
T ′i (xi) for each (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
∏
i∈I
Xo;
and P ′X :
∏
i∈I Y oi → 2
∏
i∈I Xo , defined by
P ′X(y1, . . . , yn) :=
∏
i∈I
PX(yi) for each (y1, . . . , yn) ∈
∏
i∈I
Y oi .
Then T ′ and P ′X are both upper semicontinuous such that each T ′(x1, . . . , xn) is non-
empty compact and convex in
∏
i∈I Y oi , and each P ′X(y1, . . . , yn) is non-empty compact
and convex in
∏
i∈I Xo. Hence, T ′ and P ′X are Kakutani multifunctions so that the
composition map P ′X ◦ T ′ :
∏
i∈I Xo → 2
∏
i∈I Xo is a Kakutani factorizable multifunc-
tion. Therefore, by Lemma 1, there exists a fixed point x¯ = (x¯1, . . . , x¯n) ∈∏i∈I Xo such
that x¯ ∈ (P ′X ◦ T ′)(x¯). Then, (x¯1, . . . , x¯n) ∈ P ′X(T ′(x¯1, . . . , x¯n)) so that there exists an
(y¯1, . . . , y¯n) ∈∏ Yo such that (y¯1, . . . , y¯n) ∈ T ′(x¯1, . . . , x¯n) =∏ (Ti(x¯i ) ∩ Yo) andi∈I i i∈I i
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such that d(x′i , y¯i ) = d(X,Yi) for each i ∈ I . Therefore, for each i ∈ I , we have
d
(
x¯i , Ti(x¯i )
)
 d(x¯i , y¯i ) = d(y¯i ,X) d
(
y¯i , x
′
i
)= d(X,Yi)
so that d(x¯i , Ti(x¯i )) = d(X,Yi), which completes the proof. 
Remarks.
(i) If X = Y1 = · · · = Yn and Ti : X → 2X , then the assumption that “Ti(x) ∩ Yoi = ∅”
is automatically satisfied. In fact, Xo = Yoi = X. In this case, the conclusion means
that x¯ is a fixed point for
∏
i∈I Ti , which implies the Bohnenblust–Karlin fixed point
theorem [5].
(ii) When |I | = 1, Theorem 1 generalizes Theorem 3.4 of Srinivasan and Veeramani [17]
by relaxing the condition “T (Xo) ⊆ Yo” into the weaker condition “T (x)∩ Yo = ∅ for
each x ∈ Xo.”
Now we give an example which is suitable for Theorem 1, but the previous theorems
due to Srinivasan and Veeramani [16,17], Basha and Veeramani[14] cannot be applied.
Example 1. Let E = R2 with the Euclidean norm, and let
X := {(x,0) | 0 x  2}; Y := {(x, y) | 0 x  2,1 y  2}.
And, let T :X → 2Y be a multifunction defined by for each (x,0) ∈ X,
T (x,0) := {(2 − x, a) ∣∣ 1 a  x2 − 2x + 2}.
Then, it is clear that each T (x,0) is non-empty closed and convex subset of Y . Also,
it is easy to see that T is upper semicontinuous on X. And, we can see that Xo = X, and
Yo = {(x,1) | 0 x  2}. In fact, d(X,Y ) = 1. Then, for each (x,0) ∈ Xo = X, it is easy to
see that T (x,0)∩Yo = {(2−x,1)} = ∅; however, T (x,0)  Yo for each x ∈ [0,1)∪ (1,2],
and T −1(u,1) is not open in X for each (u,1) ∈ Y so that the previous theorems due to
Srinivasan and Veeramani [16,17], Basha and Veeramani [14] cannot be applied. Therefore,
all the hypotheses of Theorem 1 are satisfied so that there exists a point x¯ = (1,0) ∈ X such
that d(x¯, T (x¯)) = d(X,Y ) = 1.
Furthermore, if we assume the stronger condition on Ti in Theorem 1, then we can
obtain the following strong proximity pair theorem:
Theorem 2. For each i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}, let X and Yi be non-empty compact and convex
subsets of a normed linear space E, and let Ti :X → 2Yi be an upper semicontinuous
multifunction in Xo such that each Ti(x) is a non-empty closed and convex subset of Yi .
Assume that for each x ∈ Xo, there exists (y1, . . . , yn) ∈∏i∈I Ti(x) such that
∃xo ∈ X with d(xo, yi) = d(X,Yi) for each i ∈ I, (∗)
and
⋂
i∈I PX(yi) is non-empty for each (y1, . . . , yn) ∈
∏
i∈I Y oi .
Then there exists a point x¯ ∈ X satisfying the system of best proximity pairs, i.e., for
each i ∈ I , {x¯} × Ti(x¯) ⊆ X × Yi such that d(x¯, Ti(x¯)) = d(X,Yi).
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each i ∈ I . As shown in the proof of Theorem 1, it is easy to prove that Xo and Yoi are
non-empty compact and convex. The closedness of Xo and Yoi follow directly from the
continuity property of the norm. Also, it is known that the metric projection map PX :E →
2X is upper semicontinuous in E such that PX(z) is a non-empty compact and convex
subset of X for each z ∈ E. For each i ∈ I , we now define a multifunction T ′i :Xo → 2Y
o
i
by
T ′i (x) := Ti(x) ∩ Yoi for each x ∈ Xo.
Then, by the assumption, each T ′i (x) is non-empty closed and convex in Y
o
i . Also, T
′
i is
upper semicontinuous in Xo, and PX(Y oi )Xo as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Now we introduce the following multifunctions T ′ :Xo → 2
∏
i∈I Y oi , defined by
T ′(x) :=
∏
i∈I
T ′i (x) for each x ∈ Xo;
and P ′X :
∏
i∈I Y oi → 2X
o
, defined by
P ′X(y1, . . . , yn) :=
⋂
i∈I
PX(yi) for each (y1, . . . , yn) ∈
∏
i∈I
Y oi .
Then, T ′ is upper semicontinuous in Xo such that T ′(x) is non-empty compact and
convex in
∏
i∈I Y oi . For each i ∈ I , if yi ∈ Yoi , then there exists an element x′i ∈ X such
that d(x′i , yi) = d(X,Yi). Note that, for each (y1, . . . , yn) ∈
∏
i∈I Y oi ,
x ∈
⋂
i∈I
PX(yi) ⇐⇒ d(x, yi) = d(X,yi) for each i ∈ I
⇐⇒ d(x, yi) = d(X,yi) d(x′i , yi) = d(X,Yi) for each i ∈ I
⇐⇒ d(x, yi) = d(X,Yi) for each i ∈ I ;
and also x ∈ Xo. Therefore, by the assumption (∗), each P ′X(y1, . . . , yn) is a non-empty
subset of Xo. Also, it is easy to see that each P ′X(y1, . . . , yn) is closed and convex
since each PX(yi) is closed and convex. Hence, T ′ and P ′X are Kakutani multifunctions
so that the composition map P ′X ◦ T ′ :Xo → 2X
o is a Kakutani factorizable multifunc-
tion. By Lemma 1, there exists a fixed point x¯ ∈ Xo such that x¯ ∈ (P ′X ◦ T ′)(x¯). Then,
x¯ ∈ P ′X(T ′1(x¯), . . . , T ′n(x¯)) so that there exists (y¯1, . . . , y¯n) ∈
∏
i∈I (Ti(x¯) ∩ Yoi ) such that
x¯ ∈ P ′X(y¯1, . . . , y¯n) =
⋂
i∈I PX(y¯i). Since each y¯i is an element in Yoi , there exists an
x′i ∈ X such that d(x′i , y¯i ) = d(X,Yi) for each i ∈ I . Therefore, for each i ∈ I , we have
d
(
x¯, Ti(x¯)
)
 d(x¯, y¯i) = d(y¯i ,X) d(y¯i , x′i ) = d(X,Yi)
so that d(x¯, Ti(x¯)) = d(X,Yi), which completes the proof. 
Remark. Theorem 2 is closely related to Theorem 3.2 of Srinivasan and Veeramani [16] by
relaxing their condition into the weaker condition (∗). In fact, they assumed the following:
for each x ∈ Xo and for each (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ ∏i∈I Ti(x), there exists xo ∈ X such that
d(xo, yi) = d(X,Yi) for each i ∈ I .
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Now we denote the best proximity set Ax of the multifunction A :X → 2Y at x by
Ax :=
{
y ∈ Y | y ∈ A(x) and d(x, y) = d(X,Y )}.
In general, Ax might be an empty-set. If (x,A(x)) is a proximity pair for A and A(x) is
compact, then Ax must be non-empty.
Using Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we shall prove a new existence theorem of equilibrium
pair for a free 1-person game:
Theorem 3. Let Γ = (X,Y,A,P ) be a free 1-person game such that
(1) X and Y are non-empty compact and convex subsets of a normed linear space E;
(2) a constraint correspondence A :X → 2Y is upper semicontinuous in Xo such that
A(x) is a non-empty closed and convex subset of Y for each x ∈ X;
(3) a preference correspondence P :Y → 2Y is such that P(y) is non-empty for each
y ∈ Y \Ax , whenever Ax := {y ∈ A(x) | d(x, y) = d(X,Y )} is non-empty;
(4) if z ∈ P−1(y), then there exists some y′ ∈ Y (possibly y′ = y) such that z ∈
intP−1(y′), and also if y ∈ A(x) for some x ∈ X, then y′ ∈ A(x);
(5) for each x ∈ Xo, A(x) ∩ Yo = ∅;
(6) for each y ∈ Y , y /∈ coP(y).
Then there exists an equilibrium pair (x¯, y¯) ∈ X × Y for Γ , i.e.,
y¯ ∈ A(x¯) such that d(x¯, y¯) = d(X,Y ) and A(x¯) ∩ P(y¯) = ∅.
Proof. Since A satisfies the whole hypotheses of Theorem 1, we can obtain a best proxim-
ity pair {x¯}×A(x¯) ⊆ X×Y for A, i.e., d(x¯,A(x¯)) = d(X,Y ). Therefore,Ax¯ is non-empty
and it is easy to see that Ax¯ is a closed and convex subset of A(x¯). In fact, let y1, y2 ∈Ax¯
and λ ∈ (0,1), and let yˆ := λy1 + (1 − λ)y2. Then, we have
d(x¯, y¯) = ∥∥x¯ − (λy1 + (1 − λ)y2)∥∥
= ∥∥λ(x¯ − y1) + (1 − λ)(x¯ − y2)∥∥
 λ‖x¯ − y1‖ + (1 − λ)‖x¯ − y2‖
= d(X,Y ),
so that yˆ ∈Ax¯ and thenAx¯ is convex. The closedness ofAx¯ is obtained from the continuity
property of the norm as already shown in the proof of Theorem 1. It remains to show that
there exists a point y¯ ∈ A(x¯) such that A(x¯) ∩ P(y¯) = ∅.
We now define a multifunction φ :Y → 2Y by
φ(y) :=
{
P(y), if y /∈Ax¯ ,
A(x¯) ∩ P(y), if y ∈Ax¯ .
Then for each y /∈Ax¯ , φ(y) is a non-empty subset of Y .
In order to apply Lemma 2 to φ, we shall show that if z ∈ φ−1(y), then there exists
some y′ ∈ Y such that z ∈ intφ−1(y′). For each y ∈ Y , we can see that
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= {z ∈Ax¯ | y ∈ φ(z)}∪ {z ∈ Y \Ax¯ | y ∈ φ(z)}
= {z ∈Ax¯ | y ∈ A(x¯) ∩ P(z)}∪ {z ∈ Y \Ax¯ | y ∈ P(z)}
= ({z ∈Ax¯ | y ∈ A(x¯)}∩ {z ∈Ax¯ | y ∈ P(z)})∪ {z ∈ Y \Ax¯ | y ∈ P(z)}
= P−1(y) ∩ ({z ∈Ax¯ | y ∈ A(x¯)}∪ {z ∈ Y \Ax¯ | y ∈ P(z)});
and hence we can obtain the following:
Case 1. y ∈ A(x¯):
φ−1(y) = P−1(y) ∩ ({z ∈Ax¯ | y ∈ A(x¯)}∪ {z ∈ Y \Ax¯ | y ∈ P(z)})
= P−1(y) ∩ (Ax¯ ∪ {z ∈ Y \Ax¯ | y ∈ P(z)})= P−1(y);
Case 2. y /∈ A(x¯):
φ−1(y) = P−1(y) ∩ ({z ∈Ax¯ | y ∈ A(x¯)}∪ {z ∈ Y \Ax¯ | y ∈ P(z)})
= P−1(y) ∩ {z ∈ (Y \Ax¯ )|y ∈ P(z)}= P−1(y) ∩ (Y \Ax¯ ).
Let z ∈ φ−1(y) be arbitrarily given. Then z ∈ P−1(y) so that, by the assumption (4),
there exists some y′ ∈ Y such that z ∈ intP−1(y′). Therefore, we have that if y′ ∈ A(x¯),
then by Case 1, we have z ∈ intP−1(y′) = intφ−1(y′). And next, if y′ /∈ A(x¯), then we
shall consider the two cases as follows:
(i) if y /∈ A(x¯), then z ∈ φ−1(y) = P−1(y) ∩ (Y \Ax¯ ) so that z ∈ Y \Ax¯ . Therefore, we
have
z ∈ intP−1(y′)∩ (Y \Ax¯ ) = int (P−1(y′)∩ (Y \Ax¯ ))= intφ−1(y′);
and
(ii) if y ∈ A(x¯), then by the assumption (4), y′ ∈ A(x¯) which is a contradiction.
Therefore, we have that if z ∈ φ−1(y), then there exists some y′ ∈ Y such that z ∈
intφ−1(y′).
By the assumption (6), y /∈ coφ(y) for each y ∈ Y so that, by applying Lemma 2 to φ,
there exists a maximal element y¯ ∈ Y such that φ(y¯) = ∅. Since P(y) = ∅ for each y /∈Ax¯ ,
we have y¯ ∈ Ax¯ and A(x¯) ∩ P(y¯) = ∅. Hence, y¯ ∈ A(x¯) such that d(x¯, y¯) = d(X,Y ),
which completes the proof. 
Remarks.
(i) In [16,17], Srinivasan and Veeramani obtained the existence theorems of equilibrium
pairs for constrained generalized games with continuous payoff functions by assuming
the strong conditions (A) and (B), respectively. However, Theorem 3 is an existence
theorem of equilibrium pair for a free 1-person game with preference multifunction P
having transfer open assumption.
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tioned before. In fact, in Theorem 3, we do not require the upper semicontinuity nor
the open lower section assumption on P .
(iii) If P has open lower sections, then the assumption (4) of Theorem 3 is automatically
satisfied by letting y′ = y.
Next, we give an example of a free 1-person game which is suitable for Theorem 3, but
the previous equilibrium existence theorems cannot be applied.
Example 2. Let Γ = (X,Y,A,P ) be a free 1-person game such that E = R2 with the
Euclidean norm, and
X := {(x,0) | 0 x  3}; Y := {(x, y) | 0 x  3,1 y  2}.
Let A :X → 2Y and P :Y → 2Y be correspondences defined by for each (x,0) ∈ X,
A(x,0) :=


{(x, a) | 1 a  2 − x}, if 0 x  1;
{(x,1)}, if 1 < x < 2;
{(x, b) | 1 b x − 1}, if 2 x  3;
and for each (x, y) ∈ Y ,
P(x, y) :=
{∅, if y = 1;
{(x′, c) | 0 x′  3,1 c < 12 (1 + y)}, otherwise.
Then, it is clear that each A(x,0) is non-empty closed and convex subset of Y . Also,
it is easy to see that A is upper semicontinuous in X. And, we can see that Xo = X, and
Yo = {(x,1) | 0 x  3}. In fact, d(X,Y ) = 1. Then, for each (x,0) ∈ Xo = X, it is easy to
see that A(x,0)∩Yo = {(x,1)} = ∅; however, A(x,0)  Yo for each x ∈ [0,3] \ (1,2), and
A−1(u,1) is not open in X for each (u,1) ∈ Y so that the previous theorems due to Ding
et al. [4], Yannelis and Prabhakar [20], Srinivasan and Veeramani [17] cannot be applied.
Since the non-empty proximity set is Ax = {(x,1)} for each x ∈ X, the assumption (3) is
satisfied. And it is easy to see that the assumptions (4) and (6) are also satisfied so that by
Theorem 3, there exists an equilibrium pair x¯ = ( 32 ,0) ∈ X and y¯ = ( 32 ,1) ∈ Y such that
y¯ ∈ A(x¯) with d(x¯,A(x¯)) = d(X,Y ) = 1 and A(x¯) ∩ P(y¯) = ∅.
When X = Y in Theorem 3, then the proximity set Ax of A is exactly the fixed point
set for A, i.e., Ax = {y ∈ A(x) | d(x, y) = d(X,Y ) = 0} = F(A) := {x ∈ X | x ∈ A(x)}.
Therefore, we can obtain the following equilibrium existence theorem for an 1-person
game:
Corollary 1. Let Γ = (X,A,P ) be an 1-person game such that
(1) X be a non-empty compact and convex subset of a normed linear space E;
(2) a constraint correspondence A : X → 2X is upper semicontinuous such that A(x) is a
non-empty closed and convex for each x ∈ X;
(3) a preference correspondence P : X → 2X is such that P(x) is non-empty for each
x /∈F(A);
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(5) for each x ∈ X, x /∈ coP(x).
Then there exists an equilibrium point x¯ ∈ X for Γ , i.e.,
x¯ ∈ A(x¯) and A(x¯) ∩ P(x¯) = ∅.
Following the standard method of generalization from 1-person game into n-person
game or generalized games with infinite agents in Ding et al. [4] or Yannelis and Prab-
hakar [20], Theorem 3 can be further generalized into a free n-person game by assuming
some conditions on Ai and Pi as in [4,7,18,20].
Let I be a finite or an infinite set of agents. For each i ∈ I, let its choice set or strategy set
Xi be a non-empty subset in a topological vector space, and let Pi : X =∏j∈I Xj → 2Xi
be a preference correspondence. Then, the collection (Xi,Pi)i∈I will be called a qualitative
game [4], and a point xˆ ∈ X is said to be an equilibrium of that game if Pi(xˆ) = ∅ for all
i ∈ I .
Before stating the existence of equilibrium pair for the free n-person game, we shall
need the following which is the special case of Theorem 3 due to Ding, Kim and Tan:
Lemma 3 [4]. Let Γ = (Xi,Pi)i∈I be a qualitative game where I is a finite set of agents
such that for each i ∈ I ,
(1) Xi is a non-empty compact and convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topologi-
cal vector space;
(2) the correspondence Pi : X = ∏j∈I Xj → 2Xi is such that xi /∈ coPi(x) for each
x ∈ X, and P−1i (z) is open in X for each z ∈ Xi .
Then there exists an equilibrium point for Γ , i.e., there exists x¯ ∈ X such that for each
i ∈ I , Pi(x¯) = ∅.
Finally, using Lemma 3, we shall prove the existence of equilibrium pairs for a free
n-person game as follows:
Theorem 4. Let Γ = (X,Yi,Ai,Pi)i∈I be a free n-person game such that for each i ∈ I =
{1, . . . , n},
(1) X and Yi be non-empty compact and convex subsets of a normed linear space E;
(2) Ai :X → 2Yi is an upper semicontinuous correspondence such that each Ai(x) is a
non-empty closed and convex subset of Yi , and satisfies the condition (∗) in Theorem 2;
(3) Pi : Y =∏j∈I Yj → 2Yi is a preference correspondence such that P−1i (z) is open for
each z ∈ Yi ;
(4) Pi(y) is non-empty for each y = (yi)i∈I ∈ Y with yi ∈ Y \ Aix , whenever Aix :=
{z ∈ Yi | z ∈ Ai(x) and d(x, z) = d(X,Yi)} is non-empty;
(5) for each y ∈ Y , yi /∈ coPi(y).
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i = 1, . . . , n, y¯i ∈ Ai(x¯) such that
d(x¯, y¯i) = d(X,Yi) and Ai(x¯) ∩ Pi(y¯) = ∅.
Proof. For each i ∈ I , since Ai satisfies the whole assumptions of Theorem 2, there exists
a point x¯ ∈ X satisfying the system of best proximity pairs, i.e., for each i ∈ I , {x¯} ×
Ai(x¯) ⊆ X × Yi such that d(x¯,Ai(x¯)) = d(X,Yi). Now we may denote the non-empty
best proximity set of the correspondence Ai at x¯ simply by
Ai :=
{
z ∈ Yi | z ∈ Ai(x¯) and d(x¯, z) = d(X,Yi)
}
.
Then, as in the proof of Theorem 3, it is easy to see that each Ai is a closed and convex
subset of a compact convex set Ai(x¯). It remains to show that there exists a point y¯ =
(y¯i)i∈I ∈ Y such that for each i ∈ I , y¯i ∈ Ai(x¯) and Ai(x¯) ∩ Pi(y¯) = ∅.
For each i ∈ I , we now define a multifunction φi : Y → 2Yi by for each y =
(y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Y ,
φi(y) :=
{
Pi(y), if yi /∈Ai ,
Ai(x¯) ∩ Pi(y), if yi ∈Ai .
Then we shall show that φ−1i (z) is open in Y for each z ∈ Yi . Note that the projection map
πi :Y → Yi , defined by πi(y1, . . . , yn) = yi , is an open map in Y . Since Ai is a closed
subset of Yi , π−1i (Ai ) is closed in Y .
Case 1. z ∈ Ai(x¯):
φ−1i (z) =
{
y ∈ Y | z ∈ φi(y)
}
= {y ∈ Y \ π−1i (Ai ) ∣∣ z ∈ φi(y)}∪ {y ∈ π−1i (Ai ) ∣∣ z ∈ φi(y)}
= {y ∈ Y \ π−1i (Ai ) ∣∣ z ∈ Pi(y)}∪ {y ∈ π−1i (Ai ) ∣∣ z ∈ Ai(x¯) ∩ Pi(y)}
= ((Y \ π−1i (Ai ))∩ P−1i (z))∪ (π−1i (Ai ) ∩ P−1i (z))
= ((Y \ π−1i (Ai ))∪ π−1i (Ai ))∩ P−1i (z) = P−1i (z),
which is open in Y .
Case 2. z ∈ Yi \ Ai(x¯):
φ−1i (z) =
{
y ∈ Y | z ∈ φi(y)
}
= {y ∈ Y \ π−1i (Ai ) ∣∣ z ∈ φi(y)}∪ {y ∈ π−1i (Ai ) ∣∣ z ∈ φi(y)}
= {y ∈ Y \ π−1i (Ai ) ∣∣ z ∈ Pi(y)}∪ {y ∈ π−1i (Ai ) ∣∣ z ∈ Ai(x¯) ∩ Pi(y)}
= ((Y \ π−1i (Ai ))∩ P−1i (z),
which is open in Y . Therefore, in both cases, φ−1i (z) is open in Y for each z ∈ Yi .
By the assumption (5), for each y ∈ Y , yi /∈ coφi(y). Therefore, the whole hypotheses
of Lemma 3 are satisfied so that there exists a point y¯ = (y¯i)i∈I ∈ Y such that φi(y¯) = ∅
for each i ∈ I . If y¯i /∈ Ai for some i ∈ I , then by the assumption (4), φi(y¯) = Pi(y¯) is a
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y¯i ∈Ai and φi(y¯) = Ai(x¯) ∩ Pi(y¯) = ∅. This completes the proof. 
Acknowledgments
The authors thank the referee for his valuable suggestions for the improvement of the paper, and thank Pro-
fessor P. Veeramani for introducing his researches on proximity pair theorems. Also the authors thank Professor
Kok-Keong Tan, Dalhousie University, Canada for the hospitality during their visits to his department in 2004.
References
[1] K.C. Border, Fixed Point Theorems with Applications to Economics and Game Theory, Cambridge Univ.
Press, Cambridge, 1985.
[2] G. Debreu, A social equilibrium theorem, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 38 (1952) 386–393.
[3] G. Debreu, Market equilibrium, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 42 (1956) 876–878.
[4] X.P. Ding, W.K. Kim, K.K. Tan, Equilibria of non-compact generalized games with L∗-majorized prefer-
ences, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 164 (1992) 508–517.
[5] J. Dugundji, A. Granas, Fixed Point Theory, vol. 1, PWN, Warsaw, 1982.
[6] K. Fan, Extensions of two fixed point theorems of F.E. Browder, Math. Z. 112 (1969) 234–240.
[7] W.K. Kim, K.H. Lee, The existence of Nash equilibrium in N -person games with C-concavity, Comput.
Math. Appl. 44 (2002) 1219–1228.
[8] E. Klein, A.C. Thompson, Theory of Correspondences, Wiley, New York, 1984.
[9] M. Lassonde, Fixed points for Kakutani factorizable multifunctions, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 152 (1990) 46–60.
[10] J. Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36 (1950) 48–49.
[11] J. Nash, Noncooperative games, Ann. of Math. 54 (1951) 286–295.
[12] S. Reich, Approximate selections, best approximations, fixed points, and invariant sets, J. Math. Anal.
Appl. 62 (1978) 104–113.
[13] S. Sadiq Basha, P. Veeramani, Best proximity pairs and best approximations, Acta Sci. Math. (Szeged) 63
(1997) 289–300.
[14] S. Sadiq Basha, P. Veeramani, Best proximity pairs theorems for multifunctions with open fibre, J. Approx.
Theory 103 (2000) 119–129.
[15] V.M. Sehgal, S.P. Singh, A generalization to multifunctions of Fan’s best approximation theorem, Proc.
Amer. Math. Soc. 102 (1988) 534–537.
[16] P.S. Srinivasan, P. Veeramani, On best approximation pair theorems and fixed point theorems, Abstr. Appl.
Anal. 2003 (2003) 33–47.
[17] P.S. Srinivasan, P. Veeramani, On existence of equilibrium pair for constrained generalized games, Fixed
Point Theory Appl. 2004 (2004) 21–29.
[18] W. Shafer, H. Sonnenschein, Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences, J. Math.
Econom. 2 (1975) 345–348.
[19] V. Vetrivel, P. Veeramani, P. Bhattacharyya, Some extensions of Fan’s best approximation theorem, Numer.
Funct. Anal. Optim. 13 (1992) 397–402.
[20] N.C. Yannelis, N.D. Prabhakar, Existence of maximal elements and equilibria in linear topological spaces,
J. Math. Econom. 12 (1983) 233–245.
